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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY,
F!a«n':.. : . .ipici.
V.

Case No. 14444
MILLER, ADAMS and CRAWFORD
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba
MAC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation, LONNY ADAMS,
GLENDA ADAMS, GERALD CRAWFORD,
DIANE CRAWFORD and LENORA
PHILLIPS,
Defendants/Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE xNATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, American States Insurance Company, sued
respondents for breach of an agreement of indemnity.
DI-PO-I ,1

'AL-.A

;.-,-jrJ

Default :udgment was er^en. i ^e^ir-st respondents
(R. 28). After the -" ud-zrier.t , ar-reli^nt d:s;:osea of collateral
given by respondent? vir,-.. .: 'attempting to jive respondents
notice or tne aispos:tion
compel s\* : ;•:"'. c'. i.r

^. ••:•_, 0

:• •" * -

.-v c s D c nc. e r, t s mc v e a t c

.djrv.nt

.-

granted the motions as to all respondents
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the lower court's granting
of the motions to compel satisfaction upheld.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 14, 1973, appellant and respondents entered
into an agreement under which respondents agreed to indemnify
appellants for any amounts appellants might have to pay on a
contract bond in connection with a construction project on
the LDS temple in St. George, Utah (R. 29-30).

When it

became apparent that appellant would have to pay on the contract bond, respondent MAC Construction Company assigned to
appellant an interest in two mechanics1 liens filed by MAC
Construction Company on another construction project, the
Sunstone Condominiums, as collateral security on the obligation of respondents to indemnify appellant (R. 65-67, 61, 121).
The fair market value of the liens was in excess of $13,676.08 (R.117)
Appellant then made payments under the bond of $13,363.65
(R. 1-2).
Appellant filed a complaint on April 12, 1974

in

the District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, to
collect the amount paid under the bond pursuant to the agreement to indemnify (R. 1-11).

Default judgment was entered

against respondents in the amount of $14,528.38, plus
interest and $1,500 attorneys1 fees (R. 28). The $14,528.38
-2-
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included the full $13,676.08 value of the liens as principal
amount, although only $13,336.65 of payments were made by
appellant on the bond (R. 2). The remainder of the $14,528.38
consisted of interest to date of judgment and costs of suit
(R. 23). The agreement of indemnity was reduced to judgment
(R. 29-30).

The November 11, 1974 Supplemental Order men-

tioned by appellant in its brief at page 4 does not appear of
record.

The only mention of the Order on the record is in an

affidavit at R. 62Respondents failed to respond to the trial proceedings initiated by appellant because Mr. Crawford, president of MAC Construction Company, was under the impression
that the transfer of the mechanicsT liens to appellant satisfied respondents' obligation to appellant under the indemnity
agreement (R. 78), and because Mr. Crawford was under the
mistaken impression, after talking with appellant's attorney,
that MAC Construction was being sued merely as a formality
to enable appellant to enforce its liens against the Sunstone
project (R. 78-79).

Respondent Lenora Phillips claimed not

to have been properly served with process, but the trial
court denied her motion to vacate judgment (R. 132).
The Sunstone Condominium project was taken over by
Central Valley Development, a corporation.

Central Valley

Development entered into an agreement with the lienors on
the Sunstone property in July of 1974, whereby the lienors
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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released their liens on certain condominium units in exchange
for a pro-rata share of the proceeds of sale of all yet unsold
units (R. 85-91).

Central Valley later claimed that the

mechanics1 liens on the Sunstone project filed by MAC
Construction Company were invalid and that the amounts
claimed by MAC were grossly exaggerated (_R, 62) . Appellant
made no attempt to contact any of the respondents, but unilaterally disposed of the mechanics1 liens given by respondents
as collateral security.

Appellant accepted $6,666.00 from

Central Valley to release the liens (R. 68). Appellant never
offered the liens to any other buyer (R. 79). Appellant
could have notified respondents since an agent of appellant
had Mr. Crawford's mailing address, and Mr. CrawfordTs forwarding address had been left with the Post Office (R. 117).
Nevertheless, appellants never contacted any of the respondents (R. 79, 118).
The trial court issued an order on December 30,
1975, granting respondents' motions to compel satisfaction of
judgment on the grounds that appellant unilaterally compromised and discounted the liens without any effort to give
notice to respondents as required by §70A-9-504, Utah Code
Ann., which notice could not be waived (R. 130-131).

This

order was extended, on January 22, 1976, to all of the
respondents (R. 136-137).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR
THE MOTION TO COMPEL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
Respondents' motion to compel satisfaction of judgment was not an attempt to set aside the default judgment
(R. 28) entered against them by belatedly raising affirmative
defenses which should have been filed prior to judgment.
Rather, respondents were merely seeking to have the judgment
declared paid after appellant had unilaterally and without
notice to respondents, disposed of the collateral security
provided by respondents.

Respondents' contention was that the

appellant had paid off $6,666.00 of the judgment by disposing
of the collateral for that sum after the judgment had been
rendered, and that the Utah Uniform Commercial Code barred the
appellant from collecting the excess.

This is not an untimely

affirmative defense barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Respondents' claim that the judgment has been
satisfied could not possibly constitute an affirmative
defense to the action underlying the judgment.

Appellant

disposed of the collateral after judgment had been rendered,
not before.
After judgment the debt is merged into the judgment.

As this court stated in Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d

397, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (1965):
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[W]hen a valid and final judgment for the payment
of money is rendered, the original claim is extinguished, and a new cause of action on the judgment
is substituted for it. In such a case, the original
claim loses its character and identity and is
merged in the judgment (emphasis added).
~~
See also Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207 (1945).
Moreover, recovery upon a judgment can be resisted on the
grounds that it has ceased to be obligatory because of payment or other discharge.

Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,

296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935); Tingwall v. King Hill Irr. Dist.,
66 Idaho 76, 155 P.2d 605 (1945); Dyal v. Dyal, 65 Ga.App.
359, 16 S.E.2d 53 (1941).

Applying collateral security will

reduce or eliminate the debt on the judgment.

In re Alburtis

Silk Ribbon Mills, 243 F. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1917); First National
Bank of Custer City v. Calkins, 12 S.D. 411, 81 N.W. 732 (1900).
The only obligation that could possibly be satisfied by appellant's disposing of the collateral security
after judgment was the judgment obligation.

It is truistic

that the payment of a judgment could not be an affirmative
defense before judgment is rendered.

Appellant itself has

conceded that the amount realized from the disposition of
the collateral, $6,666.00, should be credited on the judgment
(R. 127); this, plus the denial of the deficiency of the judgment, due to appellant!s failure to comply with the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, fully satisfies the obligation of respondents
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under the judgment.

The doctrine of res judicata simply has

no application to this case.
POINT II
ARTICLE NINE OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PRECLUDES APPELLANT FROM
COLLECTING THE DEFICIENCY ON THE JUDGMENT
A.

The Utah Uniform Commercial Code is applicable to this
case.
Section 70A-9-102, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9103 on multiple state transactions and in Section
70A-9-104 on excluded transactions, this chapter
applies so far as concerns any personal property and
fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state.
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its
form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles,
chattel paper, accounts or contract rights; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights
or chattel paper.
(2) This chapter applies to security interests
created by contract including pledge, assignment,
chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale,
trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security.
This chapter does not apply to statutory liens
except as provided in Section 70A-9-310.
(3) The application of this chapter to a security
interest in a secured obligation is not affected by
the fact that the obligation is itself secured
by a transaction or interest to which this chapter
does not apply (emphasis added).
Section 70A-9-102(2) indicates that the creation of

statutory liens is not covered by the chapter on secured transactions.

Mechanics' liens are statutory liens, under Title

38 of the Utah Code.

Nevertheless, §70A-9-102(3) provides that
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the chapter on secured transactions does apply to security
interests in a secured obligation itself secured by a transaction or interest to which the chapter on secured transactions
does not apply; the fact situation in this case falls under
this provision.

The creation of the mechanics1 liens was

governed not by the commercial code, but by Title 38 of the
Utah Code.

However, when the liens were transferred as col-

lateral security, the Commercial Code began to govern the
transactions concerning the liens.

The illustration contained

in Official Comment Four to Section 9-102 of the Uniform
Commercial Code makes this clear:
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his
neighbor, and secures his note by a mortgage on
Blackacre. This Article is not applicable to the
creation of the real estate mortgage. Nor is it
applicable to a sale of the note by the mortgagee,
even though the mortgage continues to secure the
note. However, when the mortgagee pledges the
note to secure his own obligation to X, this
Article applies to the security interest thus
created, which is a security interest in an
instrument even though the instrument is secured by
a real estate mortgage. This Article leaves to
other law the question of the effect on rights under
the mortgage of delivery or non-delivery of the
mortgage or of recording or non-recording of an
assignment of the mortgagee's interest. See
Section 9-104 (j).
In Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp., 264 Cal.App.2d
576, 70 Cal.Rptr. 664, 658 (1968), the court held that a
security interest in a secured obligation which is in turn
secured by a lien on real estate is governed by Article Nine
of the Uniform Commercial Code.

See also Black v. Sullivan
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48 Cal.App.3d 557, 122 Cal.Rptr. 119, 124 (1975); Bank of
California v. Leone, 37 Cal.App.3d 444, 112 Cal.Rptr. 394,
396 (1974).

In E. Landau Industries, Inc. v. 385 McLean

Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1279 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969), it was
held that a mortgage of a leasehold interest constitutes
personal property, and that where the mortgage is given to
secure payment of a second obligation, the second holder of
the mortgage is subject to the provisions of Article Nine of
the Uniform Commercial Code in the enforcement of his rights
as against the assigning party.

In the recent case of In re

Western Leasing, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1369, 1374 (U.S.
Dist.Ct.D.Ore. 1975), the court stated that:
Regardless of whether there is [an] exclusion of
subject matter, there is a clear intention in [U.C.C.
9-102(3)] to carry into all exclusionary provisions
the distinction between a security interest in a
secured obligation and the secured obligation itself and to apply all provisions of the Commercial
Code to the interests arising by reason of the sale
of chattel paper (emphasis added).
See also Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Ill.App.2d 243,
243 N.E.2d 501 (1968); Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill.App.2d 43,
236 N.E.2d 425 (1968) (in both cases beneficial interests in
land trusts were held covered by U.C.C. Art. Nine); White §
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 773 (1972); 4 Anderson,
Uniform Commercial Code, 24 (2d ed. 1971).
B*

Failure to give notice of disposal of security bars
collection of any deficiency.
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Under Article Nine of the Code, there is a duty on
the part of the secured party to give notice to the debtor
prior to disposition of the collateral security supplied by
the debtor.

U.C.A. §70-9-504(3) provides:

Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to
decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable
notificiation of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor
. . . (emphasis added).
Moreover, this duty to notify may not be waived.

U.C.A.

§70A-9-501(3) provides:
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor
and impose duties on the secured party, the rules
stated in the subsections referred to below may
not be waived or varied . . .
(b) Sebsection (3) of Section 70A-9-504 and
subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-505 which deal
with disposition of collateral . . . .
The Code places such emphasis on the duty to
notify because notice is essential to the debtor's being able
to protect his interests, for example, by bidding in at the
sale or by redeeming under U.C.A. §70A-9-506.

In the present

case notice would have allowed respondent to challenge
Central Valley's claim that the liens held by appellant were
invalid or grossly exaggerated.
Appellant argues that, notwithstanding the Uniform
Commercial Code, the requirement of notice was waived in this
case through the waiver of notice provision contained in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agreement of indemnity.

Appellant contends that this provision

now has res judicata effect.

This is not so.

The failure of

notice could not have occurred until after judgment when the
appellant unilaterally disposed of the collateral security.
It could not possibly have been an affirmative defense before
judgment and is not now barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
See, e.g., United Pentacostal Church of Louisville v. Milam,
527 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Colo.App. 1974); Meder v. CCME Corp.,
7 Wash.App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1972); Herl v. State
Bank of Parsons, 195 Kan. 35, 403 P.2d 110, 115 (1965).
The illegality of the waiver of notice provision in
the agreement of indemnity was not and could not have been
decided by the default judgment.

The mere reduction to judg-

ment of an agreement containing an unlawful provision does not
override the express statutory mandate and public policy of
this State to protect the debtor's interests by requiring the
secured party to give notice of disposition of collateral.
The waiver of notice provision was void from its inception,
and the default judgment did not clothe it with validity.

The

notice requirement was binding on appellant both before and
after judgment.

Appellant asserts that the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 55(a)(2), made it exempt from the requirement in U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) that notice must be given to the
debtor when a secured party disposes of collateral.

Rule

55(a)(2) only provides that procedural notice to a party in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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default need no longer be given.

It does not exempt secured

parties from giving the required substantative notice under
U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3).

Rule 55 is a rule of civil procedure

and does not purport to govern secured transactions, and should
not be interpreted to do so.

Furthermore, in this case the

collateral was disposed of after suit, after judgment, and the
required notice under U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) can in no sense be
interpreted as "procedural".
In the present case an attempt to give notice by
appellant would not have been futile.

Appellant had respondent

CrawfordTs address, and the Post Office had his forwarding
address (R. 117); but appellant never even tried to give notice.
The remedy for failure to even attempt to give
notice under U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) is that the secured party
must take only the amount collected on disposition of the
collateral and is barred from collecting any deficiency.
In refusing to allow the secured party to collect
the deficiency after disposing of collateral without notice
to the debtor as required by Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court in Skeels v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964), said:
[T]o permit a recovery by a security holder of a
loss in disposing of collateral when no notice has
been given, permits a continuation of the evil
which the Commercial Code sought to correct . . .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In my view it must be held that a security holder
who sells without notice may not look to the"
debtor for any loss (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has also held that
the secured party must notify the debtor of disposition of the
collateral as a condition precedent to recovering a deficiency.
In Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb- 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974),
the court stressed the mandatory language of Section 9-504(3)
which provides that Reasonable notification

. . . shall

be sent by the secured partyft, and found it significant that
this mandatory language occurred in the very section that
affirms the right to a deficiency judgment after sale of the
collateral.

The court construed Section 9-504 to mean that

"If the creditor wishes a deficiency judgment, he must obey
the law.

If he does not obey the law he cannot secure a

deficiency judgment."

223 N.W.2d at 59.

In Atlas Thrift v. Horan, 27 Cal.App.3d 999, 104
Cal.Rptr. 315 (1972), the court held notice of disposition of
collateral to be a condition precedent to recovery of the
deficiency, pointing out that Section 9-507, which allows
a cause of action in the debtor for any loss he sustains by
reason of the secured partyTs failure to give notice, is not
an exclusive remedy, and does not purport to have any bearing
on the right to recover the deficiency after sale of collateral.
Likewise, U.C.A. §70A-9-507(1) should not be construed as
exclusive, nor as affecting the right to any deficiency.
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Rather the solution to the deficiency issue should be sought
in U.C.A. §70-9-504, which does purport to bear on the right
to recover the deficiency, and which requires notice be given
as a condition precedent, as the Nebraska court has pointed out
supra.

See also J. T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal.App.3d

474, 119 Cal.Rptr. 578 (1975); Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal.App.3d
336, 115 Cal.Rptr. 272 (1974); In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203
(9th Cir. 1975).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine agrees with the
California cases that Section 9-507(1) does not create an
exclusive remedy and that failure to give notice under Section
9-504(3) results in a denial of the deficiency to the secured
party.

In Camden National Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329

(Me. 1973), the court explains that given the learning and
experience of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, if
they had intended Section 9-507(1) to be the exclusive remedy
they would have been scrupulously careful to state it.
In Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank $ Trust Co., 281
So.2d 534 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the court held that "In
the absence of a required notice by the secured creditor pursuant to [U.C.C. 19-504(3)], the creditor forfeits his right
to any deficiency against any debtor not so notified."
So.2d at 536.

281

The court looked to the common law on deficiency

judgments and concluded that the right to the deficiency can
only accrue after strict compliance with the relevant statutes.
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For law prior to the adoption of the Code, see C.I.T. Corp.
v. Haines, 212 A.2d 436 (Me. 1965) and the cases cited therein
at 439, which are analogous to the present case, although they
deal with the resale of repossessed property under a conditional sales contract.

Cf. Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co.,

106 Utah 166, 146 P.2d 284 (1944) (after granting an extension
of time, seller required to give notice as condition precedent
to repossession).

The most recent Florida case holding notice

of disposition of collateral a condition precedent to the
recovery of a deficiency is Hepworth v. Orlando Bank § Trust
Co., 323 So.2d 41 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975).
The cases discussed here are not exhaustive of those
cases holding a creditor is denied a deficiency for failure to
notify the debtor on disposition of collateral.

See the cases

collected in Annotation, 59 A.L.R.3d 401, 409-412 (1974), as
well as the recent decisions of the Georgia and Iowa Supreme
Courts:

Gurwich v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934,

214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Farrar,
231 N.W.2d 602 (1975).
This line of cases, which clearly represents the
majority rule, is the better view.

These cases recognize

that for the law to effectively protect the interests of the
debtor, the requirement that the secured party give notice to
the debtor must have teeth.

A suit for damages against the

creditor is not always an effective remedy since, for various
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reasons, the debtor may not always be able to bring such a
suit.

On the other hand, denying the creditor the right to

collect a deficiency will protect the debtor's interest.

The

notice requirement is intended to provide the debtor with a
chance to see to it a fair price is obtained on the sale of
the collateral, or to redeem the collateral himself.

If the

creditor will not follow this simple requirement of the law,
he has taken upon himself any risk of loss on the resale.

It

would be unfair to hold the debtor liable for loss on the
resale when he was not given the opportunity to protect
himself.
CONCLUSION
Since satisfaction of judgment could not possibly
have arisen as a defense before judgment, respondents1 motion
to compel satisfaction of judgment could not be barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.

Rather, the lower court was correct

in granting the motion because with the amount realized on
disposal of the liens and with the denial to appellant of any
recovery of the deficiency under Utah Uniform Commercial
Code Article Nine, the judgment was fully satisfied.
ruling of the trial court should be upheld.
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